



**Draft**

**Title:** The EGP opposes the EU-Mercosur Agreement

**Tabled by:** Ecolo

## OVERVIEW AMENDMENTS

- [AS ADOPTED - The EGP opposes the EU-Mercosur Agreement](#)
- [Consolidated text - Mercosur](#) (8 December 10:30)
- [For CAS 9 - Consolidated text Mercosur](#) (7 December 21:00)
- [Final PDF updated spreadsheet amendments Mercosur](#) (7 December 23.59)
- [For CAS 4 - PDF updated spreadsheet amendments Mercosur](#) (5 December PM)
- [Post CAS 2 - PDF updated spreadsheet amendments Mercosur](#) (4 December)

- [for CAS 2 - PDF updated spreadsheet amendments Mercosur](#) (3 December)
- [PDF spreadsheets amendments Mercosur](#) (27 November)

## Draft text

1 As Greens, we believe in a global trading system that is based on global justice  
2 and solidarity, shapes globalization for the better, and puts human wellbeing at  
3 its centre while taking into account the biophysical limits of the planet. We  
4 believe in reshaping the EU's trade policy towards sustainable development and  
5 stronger human rights protection.

6 Therefore, we are deeply worried by the negotiations between the EU and the  
7 Mercosur countries to conclude an Association Agreement affecting 700 million  
8 people and that would be the world's most ambitious bi-regional agreement. These  
9 negotiations to complete the agreement in principle tentatively announced in  
10 2019 hinge notably a Joint Instrument tabled by the European Commission and the  
11 counterproposal put forward by the Mercosur.

## 12 The expected outcome

13 Even though the texts discussed since the Joint Instrument and the Mercosur  
14 counterproposal (both were leaked) are not public, the final agreement will  
15 likely fall short of the EU demands in the Joint Instrument and even fail to  
16 meet the level of ambition shown in the EU-New Zealand Agreement, which was  
17 hailed as the "gold standard". Mercosur countries are steadfast in their  
18 rejection of sanctions or additional sustainability requirements. **The EU-  
19 Mercosur agreement will therefore be incompatible with the European Green Deal  
20 and the Sustainable Development Goals. We share the view of Latin American [trade  
21 unions](#), [CSOs](#) and [academia](#) who consider that this Agreement will deepen economic  
22 asymmetries, locking Mercosur countries into a development path based on agri-  
23 food and mineral exports and hindering economic diversification.**

24 On the EU side, the attempts to pursue the trade agreement have already led to a  
25 **legislative chilling effect**. The long overdue animal welfare review was

26 presumably put on the backburner because it would have impaired imports from  
27 Mercosur. In the same vein, the President of the European Commission announced a  
28 one-year delay to the Deforestation Regulation, two weeks after [bilateral](#)  
29 [meetings with presidents](#) of Mercosur countries who repeated their concerns about  
30 this supposed “trade irritant”.

31 The Agreement was opposed by **farmers** during their protests over the winter of  
32 2023-2024 for fear of unfair competition from unmanageable flows of imports.  
33 Despite words of comfort from the political parties in power ahead of the  
34 European election and the recommendations of the recent Strategic Dialogue on  
35 the Future of EU Agriculture calling for a “stronger alignment of imports with  
36 EU food and farming standards” and a fundamental rethinking of agriculture’s  
37 place in EU trade agreements, the EU-Mercosur Agreement has not been adapted  
38 accordingly. EU farmers will be exposed to competition from agri-food products  
39 that do not comply with higher EU sanitary and phytosanitary standards and use  
40 toxic chemicals (fungicides, herbicides, insecticides) banned in the EU. Like  
41 [farmers’ organisations](#), we consider that the proposal floated by the Commission  
42 to create a new fund to compensate European [farmers for any negative impact](#) of  
43 the EU-Mercosur agreement is an acknowledgement that the Agreement will indeed  
44 harm farmers. Rather than tackling root causes, the Commission only suggests  
45 that EU taxpayers foot the bill for the benefit of export sectors.

46 Since the pandemic and Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, the  
47 risks of disruption to EU supply chains have become evident, including the EU’s  
48 growing demand for **strategic and critical raw materials**. Most of the world’s  
49 energy transition mineral projects are located either on or near [Indigenous](#)  
50 [peoples’ or peasant lands](#) posing serious risks for human rights-compatible  
51 permitting, consultation, and consent. Mercosur countries have huge reserves of  
52 lithium, copper and other minerals. But the Agreement does not refer to the UN  
53 principle of free, prior and informed consent, or to the UN Declaration on the  
54 Rights of Peasants, or to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of  
55 Indigenous Peoples. Growing trade in raw materials seriously risks increasing  
56 human rights violations, environmental degradation, including water scarcity and  
57 pollution, and public health issues. Deforestation, which could rise by as much  
58 as [25 per cent due to the Agreement](#), brings the same concerns.

59 We also have concerns regarding **gender equality and women’s empowerment**. The  
60 [sustainability impact assessment](#) already outlined the “risks to women’s economic  
61 independence” and academic research has projected overall [negative impacts for](#)  
62 [women in the labour market](#).

63 **Towards the finalization of the deal**

64 Over the last months, European Commission negotiators have continued technical  
65 discussions with their South American counterparts, aiming to announce a final  
66 agreement by the end of 2024. To our knowledge, the conditions for fair  
67 competition, including for the farming sector, have not been included among the  
68 concrete proposals, or even discussions. The process thus ignores the Strategic  
69 Report’s recommendations on agriculture commissioned by the President of the  
70 European Commission.

71 The Greens are alarmed by the possibility that the Commission **splits the**  
72 **Association Agreement** to facilitate the adoption of the Trade part, which  
73 requires a qualified majority voting (contrary to the Political and Cooperation  
74 part subject to the unanimity rule). Such a decision would circumvent the  
75 opposition of some Member States and bypass Parliamentary oversight, running  
76 counter to the 2018 Council Conclusions declaring the Mercosur Agreement as a  
77 [mixed agreement](#).

78 We are also worried about the **rebalancing mechanism** requested by the Mercosur  
79 countries. This demand to be compensated for possible negative externalities of  
80 EU autonomous measures would violate the EU’s strategic autonomy and right to  
81 regulate. It would set a dangerous precedent for future EU trade agreements. It  
82 would also create uncertainty about the future implementation of the Carbon  
83 Border Adjustment Mechanism, which has been fiercely criticized by Mercosur  
84 countries.

85 We **support a closer relationship with Mercosur partners** but based on another  
86 narrative and hinging on other modalities. The Greens in the European Parliament  
87 commissioned a study on [alternative partnerships that put people and planet](#)  
88 first and that can definitively turn the page on the “cows for cars” approach to  
89 trade.

90 **For all the above-mentioned reasons, the European Green Party:**

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- **states its opposition to the EU-Mercosur Agreement**
  - **calls on member states to withdraw their support to the negotiation mandate given to the Commission**
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- **calls on the European Parliament, the European Council and the Member States to reject this Agreement and refuse its splitting**
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- **calls on its national members to stand with civil society organisations against the Agreement**
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## Background

On 28 June 2019, the European Commission and Mercosur, the free-trade zone of Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Bolivia, reached a **political agreement “in principle”**, 25 years after the start of the talks. The announcement raised many concerns and controversies in Europe.

In an October 2020 [resolution](#), the European Parliament affirmed that “the EU-Mercosur agreement **cannot be ratified as it stands**” because it did not ensure fair competition and lacked a binding and enforceable chapter on sustainable development.

In February 2023, mindful of the concerns about the Agreement, the stance of the EP resolution, and the Commission’s own strategy to strengthen labour, environmental and civil society provisions in free trade agreements, the Commission tried to salvage the deal by proposing a **Joint Instrument**. This instrument aimed to clarify and make more concrete the commitments contained in the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter, including the fight against deforestation, labour and human rights protection, and the effective implementation of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework.

Mercosur produced its **counterproposal** in September 2023, rejecting the possibility of sanctions in case of violation or failure to respect sustainable development commitments. They also demanded that the Agreement “be equipped with a mechanism to rebalance trade concessions negotiated under the Agreement if these concessions are suspended or nullified due to domestic EU legislation”. Since then, EU and Mercosur negotiators have met regularly and hope to conclude talks by the end of 2024.

## Supporters

Irish Green Party / Comhaontas Glas, Groen, Les Écologistes - Europe Ecologie Les Verts, GroenLinks, Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative, Verdes Equo