

EGP fact-finding mission to Romania - Report

Context

During the 12-13 June 2026 meeting of the Committee of the *European Green Party* (hereinafter *EGP*) the Committee decided to trigger the evaluation process of the Full Membership of *Partidul Verde (Green Party)*, the Full Member Party of *EGP* from Romania, according to point 4.14 of the Statutes of the European Green Party.

As a next step a fact-finding mission was organised to Romania on 7-9 September 2026 with the participation of EGP co-chair Ciarán Cuffe, Secretary General Benedetta De Marte, as well as Committee members Marieke van Doorninck and Sibylle Steffan, who are the co-responsible Committee members in charge of Romania.

EGP's delegation visited the capital city Bucharest during the fact-finding mission to organise in person exchanges of views with various Romanian interlocutors on the role and activities of *Partidul Verde* in Romanian politics and society.

The present report summarises the findings of the fact-finding mission.

Short history of the party

Partidul Verde (Green Party) is a Romanian political party that was established in its current legal format in November 2005.

The roots of *Partidul Verde (Green Party)* go back to the *Federația Ecologistă din România (Ecologist Federation of Romania)*, established in 1990, as part of the emergence of organised environmental politics following the fall of communism in Romania.

Federația Ecologistă din România (hereinafter *FER*) became a Full Member of the predecessor of the *European Green Party* in October 1999.

When *FER* was dissolved in February 2004, its membership of the *European Green Party* subsequently passed to *Partidul Verde* (hereinafter *PV*), which was founded in November 2005 as the political and institutional successor of *FER*. The *European Green Party* recognised this as a continuation of the membership dating back to the admission of *FER* in 1999.

PV participated in the Romanian parliamentary elections of 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 under its own name or through an electoral alliance.

Its best result in these elections was achieved in 2008, when the electoral alliance between *PV* and *Partidul Ecologist Român (Romanian Ecologist Party)*, called *Partidul Verde Ecologist (Green Ecologist Party)*, gained approximately 0.7% of the vote for the Romanian Senate.



The best result *PV* ever achieved on its own was 0.4% of the vote for the Romanian Senate during the Romanian parliamentary election of 2020.

In the 2012 Romanian parliamentary elections, *PV* did not run a separate national list. Ovidiu Iane of *PV* and Remus Cernea of *Mișcarea Verzilor - Democrați Agrarieni* (*The Green Movement - Agrarian Democrats*) instead stood on the lists of the *Uniunea Social Liberală* (*Social Liberal Union*) coalition and were elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

To date they were the only two Members of the Romanian Parliament associated with *PV* since the party was established in 2005.

Mișcarea Verzilor - Democrați Agrarieni (*The Green Movement - Agrarian Democrats*), the party of Remus Cernea, subsequently merged into *PV* in January 2013.

In April 2013 Ovidiu Iane announced that he was leaving *PV* and subsequently joined *Partidul Social Democrat* (*Social Democratic Party*).

In May 2013, *PV* ended their cooperation with the *Uniunea Social Liberală* (*Social Liberal Union*) over disagreements concerning the government's shale gas policy and the party's opposition to the Roșia Montană gold mining project.

In November 2013 Remus Cernea also left *PV* citing internal tensions, disagreements over values and disputes about the party's strategy for the 2014 European elections. Thus, the party was left without parliamentary representation only one year after gaining it for the first time.

PV last contested a European Parliamentary election on its own in 2014, when it received approximately 0.3% of the national vote and elected no Member of the European Parliament.

The party has not fielded its own candidate in a Romanian presidential election since 2009. In the 2009 Romanian presidential election, *PV* fielded environmental activist Remus Cernea as its candidate for President of Romania. Cernea eventually received 0.6% of the valid votes cast.

In February 2019, Adi-Maria Claudia Luminița Simoiu was elected chairperson of *PV* at the party's National Congress. A leadership conflict emerged several months later. Two separate meetings of the party's National Council were convened for 15 June 2019, one in Sibiu by Simoiu and another in Bucharest by other members of the leadership. At the Bucharest meeting, Simoiu was suspended as chairperson and a new Extraordinary Congress was convened.

At the Extraordinary Congress on 20 July 2019, Romanian actor and television personality Florin Călinescu was elected chairperson of the party. Several controversial public statements were made by Călinescu during his tenure as chairperson, which were attributed to the party in the Romanian public.



Simoiu challenged the above decisions in court, arguing that the party's statutes had been breached. In December 2020, the Bucharest Tribunal initially ruled in her favour, annulling both the 15 June 2019 leadership decision and the 20 July 2019 Congress at which Călinescu had been elected. The judgment was not final. In October 2021, the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld an appeal by *PV*, reversed this part of the Tribunal's judgment and dismissed Simoiu's action as lacking legal interest. Simoiu subsequently sought the annulment of the appellate judgment, but this challenge was definitively rejected by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in June 2022.

Due to this leadership conflict, some of the party's rights in the *European Green Party* were suspended in this period according to the decision of the *EGP*'s Council (the former name of the *EGP*'s Congress). The restrictions were lifted following the definitive judgement of the Bucharest Court of Appeal.

In September 2022 the party held another Extraordinary Congress under the banner *Verzii 2.0 (Greens 2.0)*, adopting a new political programme and introducing a system of gender balanced co-leadership at national and local level. Former *Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democratic Party)* politician Marius Lazăr and former *Uniunea Salvați România (Save Romania Union)* MP Lavinia Cosma were elected co-chairs, while likewise former *Uniunea Salvați România (Save Romania Union)* MP and environmental activist Adrian Dohotaru became Executive President.

Following another internal leadership conflict in 2023, a Congress held in Bucharest on 24 June 2023 elected Rodica Bărbuță and Bogdan Botea as co-chairs, Matei Nicolaie as Executive President and Silviu Dumitru as Secretary General. The change followed a National Council meeting in May 2023 at which Lazăr and Cosma had been removed from the leadership.

Lazăr and Cosma disputed their removal and organised a separate, parallel congress, resulting in further litigation over which leadership and congress decisions were valid.

During this period, the *EGP* did not manage to identify the delegates of *PV* to its Councils and Congresses, due to conflicting decisions arriving to the secretariat from the different factions within *PV*, who were entangled in a legal battle over the ownership of the party. Thus, *PV* was not casting its votes at *EGP* events during this time.

On 21 November 2024 the Bucharest Tribunal ordered the decisions of *PV*'s 20 May 2023 National Council to be entered in the Register of Political Parties. Those were the decisions through which Marius Lazăr and Lavinia Cosma had been removed as co-chairs. The judgment became final on 20 December 2024 because no appeal was filed.

Separate proceedings concerning the 24 June 2023 Congress, which elected Bogdan Botea and Rodica Bărbuță, continued into 2025. In March 2025 the Tribunal took the registration request off the contentious court docket and forwarded the Congress documents to the register of political parties. That decision itself became final on 24 October 2025.



Currently, *PV* has no representatives of its own in either chamber of the Romanian Parliament or in the European Parliament.

Its elected representation is at local level following the 2024 Romanian local elections, including councillors in municipalities such as Bacău and Târgu Jiu.

The electoral history of *PV*

In elections for the Romanian parliament:

Year	Party or alliance	% in the Chamber of Deputies	% in the Senate	MPs elected
2008	<i>PVE</i> alliance ¹	0.3%	0.7%	0
2012	<i>USL</i> alliance ²	58.6%	60.1%	2 (1+1)
2016	<i>PV</i>	0.01%	0.01%	0
2020	<i>PV</i>	0.4%	0.4%	0
2024	<i>PV</i> ³	0.003%	0.003%	0

In elections for the European Parliament:

Year	Party or alliance	%	MEPs elected
2007	<i>PV</i>	0.4%	0
2009	did not contest	-	-
2014	<i>PV</i>	0.3%	0
2019	did not contest	-	-
2024	did not contest ⁴	-	-

¹ *Partidul Verde Ecologist (Green Ecologist Party)* alliance, composed of *PV* and *Partidul Ecologist Român (Romanian Ecologist Party)*.

² *Uniunea Social Liberală (Social Liberal Union)*, which was a grand coalition of the two major Romanian parties, the *Partidul Social Democrat (Social Democratic Party)* and the *Partidul Național Liberal (National Liberal Party)*, as well as three minor parties, including *PV*.

³ *PV* only ran in Brăila county in this election.

⁴ *PV* endorsed the independent candidacy of MEP Nicolae Ștefănuță.

Short overview of the political situation in the country

- Unitary semi-presidential republic with a bicameral parliament, consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.
- Population: approximately 19 million
 - 77.7% Romanians
 - 5.2% Hungarians
 - 3% Roma
 - 0.2% Ukrainians
 - 0.1% Germans
 - 0.1% Turks
 - 0.1% Russians
 - 13% with undeclared ethnicity
- NATO member (since 2004)
- EU member (since 2007)
- According to the IMF's latest estimate, Romania's nominal GDP in 2025 was approximately USD 427.9 billion, while GDP at purchasing power parity was approximately USD 917.6 billion. GDP per capita stood at approximately USD 22,725 nominally and USD 48,724 at PPP, placing Romania around 56th globally in nominal GDP per capita and 50th in GDP per capita at PPP. The economy is predominantly service based: the latest OECD breakdown puts services at 63.3% of value added, industry including construction at 31.8%, and agriculture, forestry and fishing at 4.9%.
- According to Eurostat, in 2024 27.9% of Romania's population was at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the second highest share in the EU after Bulgaria. The figure declined slightly to 27.4% in 2025, but remained among the highest in the EU. At the time of writing, Romania's annual harmonised inflation rate stood at 6.3% in August 2026, the highest rate in the EU, compared with an EU average of 3.2%.
- *Transparency International's* [Corruption Perception Index](#) for 2025 ranks Romania as 70th out of 182 countries and territories worldwide, with a score of 45/100, one point lower than in 2024. The EU average is 62/100, placing Romania 25th out of 27 EU Member States, ahead only of Bulgaria and Hungary, which both scored 40/100.
- *Freedom House's* [Freedom in the World report for 2026](#) designates Romania as “free”, giving it a total score of 83/100 (35/40 for political rights and 48/60 for civil liberties), up from 82/100 in the 2025 edition. The latest available [Nations in Transit report](#), from 2024, designates Romania as a “semi-consolidated democracy”, giving it a democracy percentage of 57/100 and a Democracy Score of 4.39/7. For comparison, Bulgaria is also designated “free” in the Freedom in the World 2026 report, but with a lower score of 74/100 (30/40 for political rights and 44/60 for civil liberties). The Nations in Transit 2024 report likewise classifies Bulgaria as a “semi-consolidated democracy”, with a democracy percentage of 59/100 and a Democracy Score of 4.54/7, slightly higher than Romania on this measure.



- *Reporters Without Borders'* [2026 World Press Freedom Index](#) ranks Romania 49th out of 180 countries, with a score of 67.71/100, an improvement from 55th place and 66.42 points in 2025. For comparison, Bulgaria ranks 71st, with a score of 60.28/100.
 - In Romania's case, the [country specific report](#) describes the media landscape as diverse and relatively pluralistic, with strong investigative journalism, but identifies serious structural problems. *Reporters Without Borders* (hereinafter *RSF*) highlights the lack of transparency around media financing, particularly the use of public funds by political parties to obtain favourable coverage, and notes that editorial decisions are often subordinated to media owners' interests. It also points to political interference in appointments to the public radio and television broadcasters and the National Audiovisual Council, as well as increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards journalists from some politicians.
 - On the legal framework, *RSF* states that Romanian legislation is broadly aligned with European standards but is insufficiently enforced. It highlights interference by prosecutors in journalistic work, growing pressure on journalists to reveal confidential sources and an increasing number of abusive lawsuits, including SLAPPs. *RSF* also identifies threats, intimidation and harassment of journalists as continuing concerns.

Politics

- At the time of writing Romania is in a prolonged government formation crisis.
 - In June 2025, following the collapse of the previous government formed after the December 2024 parliamentary election, a four-party grand coalition government was formed, consisting of the *Social Democratic Party - PSD* (**PES**), the *National Liberal Party - PNL* (**EPP**), the *Save Romania Union - USR* (**ALDE**) and the *Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania - UDMR* (**EPP**).
 - This government was headed by *PNL* (**EPP**) leader Ilie Bolojan, as Prime Minister.
 - However, *PSD* (**PES**) withdrew from the coalition in April 2026 and joined a no-confidence motion with *Alliance for the Union of Romanians - AUR* (**ECR**), among others, that brought down the Bolojan government on 5 May 2026.
 - Bolojan's cabinet, minus the former *PSD* (**PES**) ministers, has remained in office in a caretaker capacity since then.
- Seven political parties crossed the nationwide 5% electoral threshold in the December 2024 parliamentary elections (all percentages are for the Chamber of Deputies):
 - *PSD* (**PES**) with 22%;
 - *Alliance for the Union of Romanians - AUR* (**ECR**) with 18%;
 - *PNL* (**EPP**) with 13.2%;
 - *USR* (**ALDE**) with 12.4%;
 - *S.O.S. Romania* (-) with 7.4%;



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- *Party of Young People* - *POT* (-) with 6.5%;
- *UDMR* (**EPP**) with 6.3%.
- The principal parties currently outside the (at the time of writing) proposed *PNL* (**EPP**) - *USR* (**ALDE**) - *UDMR* (**EPP**) minority government are therefore *PSD* (**PES**), *AUR* (**ECR**), and the two parties that are different flavours of far-right, *S.O.S. Romania* (-) and *POT* (-), although defections and the creation of additional parliamentary groups since the 2024 parliamentary election have made the parliamentary landscape more fragmented than the original election result suggests.
- Romanian politics has traditionally been dominated by *PSD* (**PES**) and *PNL* (**EPP**) and their predecessor parties, which have alternated in government or governed together for much of the post-communist period.
- *UDMR* (**EPP**), representing primarily Romania's Hungarian minority, has also been one of the most durable parliamentary forces and has repeatedly participated in governments led by both the centre-left and centre-right.
- By contrast, *USR* (**ALDE**) was founded in its current national form in 2016, the same year when it entered parliament, while *AUR* (**ECR**) entered parliament for the first time in 2020.
- *S.O.S. Romania* (-) and *POT* (-) are the newest parliamentary entrants, both entering parliament in 2024.
- The 2024 - 2025 presidential election crisis substantially reshaped the political landscape in Romania. The first round of the November 2024 presidential election was unexpectedly won by independent Călin Georgescu, but the Constitutional Court subsequently annulled the entire election amid allegations of unlawful campaign activity and Russian interference.
 - The election was rerun in May 2025. Independent Bucharest mayor Nicușor Dan, originally a founder of *USR* (**ALDE**), defeated *AUR* (**ECR**) leader George Simion in the second round with around 54% of the vote and became President of Romania.
- The combination of the fragmented 2024 parliament, the annulled presidential election, the formation of the broad *PSD* (**PES**) - *PNL* (**EPP**) - *USR* (**ALDE**) - *UDMR* (**EPP**) coalition in 2025 and its collapse less than a year later has produced an unusually unstable period in Romanian national politics.
 - Since the fall of the Bolojan government in May 2026, President Dan has nominated three prospective prime ministers, with two failing to gain support until the time of writing. At the time of writing, the third is in the process of assembling his potential cabinet.
- Under the normal electoral calendar, the next parliamentary election is due in 2028, as both chambers have four year mandates.
- Local elections are also normally due in 2028.
- President Nicușor Dan was elected for a five year term in 2025, making the next regular presidential election due in 2030.



European Parliament

- The country elects 33 MEPs in a single nationwide constituency.
- Political parties and electoral alliances must obtain at least 5% of valid votes nationwide to qualify for the allocation of seats.
- Independent candidates are exempt from the 5% threshold and instead need at least the national electoral coefficient, calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by Romania's 33 seats.
- Romania's current 33 MEPs are divided between:
 - 11 in **S&D**;
 - 10 in **EPP**;
 - 6 in **ECR**;
 - 3 in **Renew**;
 - 2 in non-attached;
 - 1 in **Greens/EFA**.

Main political values in the programme

PV adopted its current political programme, "*România Justă. O Țară Sănătoasă*" (*A Just Romania. A Healthy Country*), at its Extraordinary Congress in September 2022 that re-launched the party. The programme explicitly defines the party as centre-left and identifies freedom, equality, social justice and the preservation of biodiversity as its fundamental values.

In October 2025, PV also published a political manifesto entitled "*Manifestul Partidului Verde (Verzii) - Împotriva extremismului, corupției și ipocriziei politice*" (*Green Party Manifesto - Against Extremism, Corruption and Political Hypocrisy*), which reiterated the party's opposition to political extremism and corruption and its support for strong public services, social justice, environmental protection and independent state institutions.

The 2022 political programme's central political proposition is that environmental justice and social justice are inseparable and that Romania should make the successful completion of the Green transition a strategic national objective, including achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

On environment and climate, the party calls for large scale investment in renewable energy, substantially greater support for household photovoltaic installations, energy storage, grid modernisation and energy cooperatives allowing citizens and communities to produce renewable electricity.

It proposes increasing spending on climate and clean energy research, developing offshore wind in the Black Sea, geothermal energy, clean hydrogen and other low carbon technologies, and reinvesting part of the revenues from carbon allowances in environmental regeneration.



The party also supports the energy efficient renovation of buildings, modernisation and electrification of railways, improved urban public transport, cycling and pedestrian infrastructure and the development of electric vehicle charging infrastructure. It advocates reducing Romania's dependence on fossil fuels while ensuring that the transition remains affordable, particularly for households affected by energy poverty.

Protection of biodiversity, forests, agriculture, water, air and soil occupies a substantial part of the programme. *PV* proposes depoliticising the state forestry company Romsilva, strengthening monitoring and enforcement against illegal logging and maintaining continuous reforestation programmes. It calls for support for organic and environmentally sustainable agriculture, shorter local food supply chains, significantly reduced pesticide and chemical fertiliser use, stronger food waste legislation and wider application of circular economy principles. The programme supports the polluter pays principle, extended producer responsibility for packaging, generalised separate waste collection, measures against planned obsolescence and a stronger right to repair. It also calls for a specialised Environmental Court and Environmental Prosecutor General, and explicitly proposes introducing ecocide into Romanian criminal law.

On democracy and fundamental rights, *PV* describes itself as committed to participatory democracy, the rule of law, political pluralism, an independent justice system and the fight against corruption. Its statutes explicitly defend fundamental rights and freedoms and prohibit discrimination on grounds including ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, age and disability. They also support gender equality, protection of disadvantaged groups, separation between church and state, religious tolerance, protection of individual rights in the digital sphere and peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

The party's 2025 manifesto places particular emphasis on combating political extremism, clientelism, corruption and state capture, as well as increasing transparency in public spending and protecting the independence of the judiciary.

On economic and social policy, *PV* argues for an ecologically sustainable social market economy in which the state plays an active role in ensuring that the benefits of economic growth are distributed more evenly. It proposes shifting more of the tax burden from labour towards capital, stronger taxation of extraordinary profits, particularly in the energy sector, and using additional revenue to finance the Green transition and support vulnerable households. The party argues that the minimum wage should be linked to the minimum cost of a decent standard of living and proposes explicit annual poverty reduction targets. It places particular emphasis on combating energy poverty through financial assistance, energy efficiency measures and guarantees against disconnection for vulnerable households. The programme also promotes a circular economy, green finance, stronger support for local businesses and investment in clean industries and high quality employment.

The party treats public services as a central component of social and environmental justice. It advocates universal access to quality healthcare and education, stronger social protection



and greater public investment rather than relying primarily on market provision. Housing, mobility, healthcare, education, culture and access to a clean environment are presented as essential components of wellbeing. On housing and urban policy, the party supports more sustainable urban planning, energy efficient construction, accessible public transport, neighbourhoods that include schools, childcare, shops, cultural and recreational facilities, more urban green space and improved accessibility for people with disabilities.

On education, research and digitalisation, *PV* proposes allocating 7% of GDP to education for a ten year period, shifting teaching towards critical thinking and practical skills, strengthening lifelong learning and improving access for people in rural areas. It supports closer European cooperation between education systems and better recognition of qualifications. The party also wants major investment in digital infrastructure and digital literacy, with a target that at least 80% of Romania's active population should have basic digital skills by 2030. It argues that digitalisation should increase administrative transparency and access to public services while protecting citizens from monopolies, excessive concentration of data and technological dependency.

The programme also gives culture, sport and animal welfare a significant role. It calls for increased public funding for culture and sport, stronger protection of cultural heritage, better legal protection for cultural professionals and the development of ecotourism. On animal welfare, the party advocates stronger legal protection for animals, reducing animal transport times, opposing excessive animal testing and combating illegal wildlife trafficking.

On European and foreign policy, *PV* is firmly pro-European and describes Romania's membership of the EU and the wider Euro-Atlantic community as fundamental to the country's development and security. It supports stronger European cooperation on climate and energy policy, European energy independence based primarily on clean energy and an EU capable of protecting social rights alongside environmental objectives. Its programme envisages a "green, social and sovereign Europe" in which citizens enjoy equal rights regardless of sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity or political views.

The party's statutes also commit it to promoting democracy and fundamental rights internationally and to peaceful means of resolving conflicts.

Existence of a youth wing

PV formally has a youth organisation, *Tinerii Verzi* (*Young Greens*).

PV's statute provides representation for *Tinerii Verzi* members under the age of 30 in the party's internal structures, while the youth organisation adopted its own statute and programme in August 2022.

However, according to information provided by *PV* during the fact-finding mission, the two previous leaders of the youth wing have since left the party, and the organisation is currently not functioning at the level it previously did.



Tinerii Verzi was admitted as a Candidate Member of the *Federation of Young European Greens* (hereinafter *FYEG*) in 2023.

During the following year, the *FYEG* Executive Committee raised concerns about the organisation's political alignment with *FYEG*'s platform and recommended its exclusion.

FYEG subsequently confirmed in its 2024 - 2025 Activity Report that *Tinerii Verzi* had been expelled from the federation by the General Assembly.

List of organised meetings during the fact-finding mission

- Elena Calistru, President and Iosif Prodan, Resource and Logistics Manager, [Funky Citizens](#)
- Vlad Viski, President and Sergiu Marinescu, Communication Director, [MozaiQ](#)
- Independent MEP in the Greens/EFA Group [Nicolae Ștefănuță](#)
- Rodica Bărbuță and Bogdan Botea, co-chairs and Silviu Dumitru, Secretary General, as well as several members of the National Political Council and the board, [Partidul Verde](#)
- Adrian Tudor, Deputy Mayor of Târgu Jiu Municipality, Mihai Neagoe, Deputy Mayor of Ghimbav, as well as several other locally elected people, [Partidul Verde](#)
- Rami Cristescu, Elena Crângașu and Florin Toader, journalists, [Cotidianul](#)
- Georgiana Iorgulescu, member of the Steering Board and former Executive Director, [Centre for Legal de Resources](#)
- Victor Ciobotaru, Executive Director, Florin Buhuceanu, activist and Iustina Ionescu, legal expert, [ACCEPT](#)
- Iulian Dițiu, President, [ARK Oradea](#)
- Cristian Pîrvulescu, Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at [SNSPA](#)
- Andrei Macsut, chairperson, Florina Presadă, vice-chair, Petruț Docu, vice-chair, Ciprian Dobre, Secretary General and several members of the National Council, [Partidul Sănătate, Educație, Natură, Sustenabilitate](#)
- [Remus Cernea](#), former *PV* Member of Parliament, currently a war correspondent in Ukraine
- Ioana Ciută, President and Laura Nazare, national campaigner, [Bankwatch România](#)
- Attila Biro, investigative journalist, [CONTEXT](#)
- Claudiu Crăciun, co-spokesperson and Ionuț Tudor, Secretary General, [Partidul Democrației și Solidarității](#)

Findings from the above meetings

From talking to several civil society stakeholders, academics, journalists and political actors (listed above) during *EGP*'s fact-finding mission to Romania, *EGP*'s delegation learned the following:

- Across the meetings, *PV* appeared to have very low public and political visibility. None of the interviewed interlocutors was able to identify the current leadership of the



party without looking it up, and several had to consult the party's website or social media accounts prior to the meetings in order to provide information about its recent activities. This was particularly notable given that the interlocutors interviewed are themselves actively involved in Romanian public, political, academic, media or civil society life.

- The only figure whom several interlocutors spontaneously associated with *PV* was former MP Remus Cernea. However, Cernea left the party in November 2013 and his parliamentary mandate ended in 2016. The fact that the most recognisable person associated with the party by the interviewed interlocutors has neither been a member of the party for approximately thirteen years nor a Member of Parliament for approximately ten years was seen by the delegation as further evidence of the party's limited ability to establish recognisable contemporary political figures.
- During the course of the fact-finding mission, interlocutors broadly agreed that there is a currently unrepresented political space in Romania for centre-left, progressive and Green voters, and that a voter base exists for a political force capable of occupying this space. At the same time, none of the interlocutors considered *PV* to be in a position to credibly represent or mobilise this electorate. Several expressed the view that the party has never developed the political profile, organisational capacity or public credibility necessary to fill this space, despite the continued existence of potential electoral demand for such a political offer.
- Some concerns were also raised regarding the political record of Florin Călinescu, who publicly led *PV* from 2019 until the party's subsequent reorganisation. During this period, Călinescu made several public statements concerning LGBTQI+ people and gender which were criticised in Romanian media as homophobic or discriminatory. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, he publicly speculated that the virus could have resulted from a laboratory designed biological or chemical weapon connected to competition between major powers. In May 2019, shortly before entering the leadership of *PV*, Călinescu also announced that he intended to vote for George Simion, then an independent candidate in the European Parliamentary elections and subsequently the founder and leader of *AUR* ([ECR](#)).
- For much of the period between 2019 and 2025, *PV* was affected by successive disputes concerning the legitimacy of its national leadership. The first involved Adi-Maria Claudia Luminița Simoiu and the party leadership that subsequently elected Florin Călinescu. A Bucharest Tribunal judgment initially annulled the decisions removing Simoiu and the Congress which elected Călinescu, although this was subsequently overturned on appeal and Simoiu's further legal challenge was finally rejected in 2022. A second major dispute began in 2023 following the removal of co-chairs Marius Lazăr and Lavinia Cosma, who contested their removal and organised competing party congresses. Litigation and registration proceedings connected to this dispute continued into 2025. The Romanian Register of Political Parties now records the leadership resulting from the June 2023 Congress, headed by co-chairs Bogdan Botea and Rodica Bărbuță.



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- These prolonged leadership disputes also affected the party's relationship with the *European Green Party*. During parts of this period, representatives associated with competing factions attended *EGP* Councils and Congresses and openly disputed one another's legitimacy. For a significant period, the succession of competing congresses and legal proceedings made it difficult for *EGP* to establish with confidence who was legally and politically authorised to represent the party. Although the legal situation has now largely been clarified, the length and intensity of these internal disputes raised concerns among the delegation regarding the party's institutional stability and organisational resilience.
- Although the current leadership has brought greater legal clarity to the party's representation, the delegation did not hear a sufficiently developed political, organisational or electoral strategy for rebuilding the party from its present position. In particular, interlocutors and the delegation were unable to identify a clear strategy for membership growth, recruitment of political personnel, development of local structures, cooperation with civil society or future electoral growth.
- The party's electoral record reinforces these concerns. The only period in which politicians associated with *PV* entered the Romanian Parliament resulted from the 2012 electoral agreement with the *Uniunea Social Liberală (Social Liberal Union)* coalition, rather than from a standalone *PV* electoral result. Neither before nor since has *PV* elected a Member of the Romanian Parliament on its own electoral list. In the 2024 parliamentary election, for example, *PV* presented candidates only in Brăila, resulting in negligible results.
- Several discussions also raised questions about the institutionalisation of internal decision making and leadership recruitment within the party. Interlocutors pointed in particular to the unusually long standing role of the Secretary General, who has occupied this or a closely related central organisational role since at least 2008, while a succession of better known public personalities, former politicians or civil society figures have entered the senior leadership of the party and subsequently departed, after a short tenure, following internal disagreements and, in some cases, litigation. The delegation heard the view that leadership recruitment can therefore appear highly personalised and opportunity driven rather than the result of a predictable process of internal political recruitment, education and development. This recurring pattern raises questions regarding succession planning, institutional continuity and the extent to which political decision making is embedded in stable and transparent party structures.
- Several civil society interlocutors reported little or no sustained engagement with *PV* in the areas in which they work, including environmental campaigning, urban development, human rights and LGBTQI+ equality. Based on these discussions, the delegation gained the impression that much of *PV*'s currently visible political activity consists of statements published through its website and social media channels, rather than sustained participation in wider civil society campaigns or policy coalitions. This assessment reflects the experience of the interlocutors interviewed and should not be understood as an exhaustive survey of all *PV* activity.



- Questions were also raised regarding membership recruitment, political coherence and due diligence. Several interlocutors described a pattern in which individuals with significantly different political ideas or expectations entered *PV*, subsequently came into conflict with other parts of the organisation, and eventually left or were removed. *PV* representatives have themselves informed *EGP* that the two previous leaders of the party's youth organisation have left the party. One additional example cited during the meetings was a former chairperson of the youth wing who, according to information provided to the delegation, subsequently became a parliamentary assistant associated with *POT* (-). More broadly, the recurrent arrival and departure of members with substantially different political orientations led several interlocutors to question whether *PV* has sufficiently robust processes for political recruitment, vetting and political education.
- Finally, several interlocutors raised concerns about a possible gap between *PV*'s formal positions on LGBTQI+ rights and attitudes within parts of its membership. *PV*'s statutes and official programme contain anti-discrimination commitments, and the party has publicly supported positions including civil partnerships for same sex couples and reproductive rights. Nevertheless, some interlocutors with direct or indirect experience of the party suggested that attempts to give LGBTQI+ rights and related human rights issues greater prominence inside the party had encountered resistance and had, in some cases, contributed to individuals distancing themselves from the organisation. These accounts did not provide sufficient evidence for the delegation to conclude that such views represent the party membership as a whole. They do, however, raise questions regarding the extent to which the values formally communicated by the party are consistently understood and shared throughout its internal structures, and therefore merit consideration when assessing the party's compatibility in practice with the values of the *European Green Party*.

Conclusions and recommendation

Conclusions

During the fact-finding mission it became evident to the delegation of the *European Green Party* that *PV* has very limited political and public visibility in Romania. Even interlocutors who are actively engaged in Romanian civil society, academia, media and public life were largely unfamiliar with the party's current leadership and activities. The only political figure whom several interlocutors spontaneously associated with the party was Remus Cernea, who left *PV* in 2013 and has not been a Member of Parliament since 2016. The delegation also found little evidence of sustained engagement by the party with relevant civil society organisations and campaigns.

The party's electoral record, limited organisational presence and the information gathered during the mission raised significant concerns regarding its political capacity and prospects for sustainable development. *PV* has never independently elected a representative to the Romanian Parliament and has not demonstrated a credible strategy for rebuilding its



membership, political structures, public profile or electoral support. While the present leadership has brought greater legal clarity following several years of internal disputes, the delegation did not identify a sufficiently developed political and organisational strategy capable of reversing the party's long term decline.

The delegation also identified concerns regarding the stability and institutionalisation of the party's internal structures. Between 2019 and 2025, successive leadership disputes and legal proceedings created prolonged uncertainty regarding the legitimate representation of the party. The recurring recruitment of new senior political figures followed by relatively short tenures and departures, sometimes accompanied by substantial internal conflict or litigation, raises further questions regarding leadership development, political recruitment, succession planning and the extent to which decision making is embedded in stable and transparent democratic structures.

Furthermore, the findings raised concerns regarding political coherence and compatibility with Green values in practice. While the party's statutes, programme and public communication formally express positions compatible with the values of the *European Green Party*, interlocutors described inconsistencies between these formal positions and attitudes encountered within parts of the organisation, particularly concerning LGBTQI+ rights. The political records of some former senior representatives, combined with recurring difficulties concerning membership recruitment and political alignment, also raised questions regarding the party's internal capacity to ensure that its representatives and members consistently reflect the political values to which the organisation formally subscribes.

Recommendation

Based on the findings of the fact-finding mission, the Committee of the *European Green Party* concludes that the concerns regarding *PV* are not limited to individual political positions or a temporary period of weak electoral performance.

Taken together, the party's very limited public relevance, prolonged organisational instability, weak electoral capacity, lack of a credible strategy for political development, limited engagement with civil society and questions regarding its internal political coherence indicate structural problems concerning its capacity to function as a credible and sustainable Green political party.

As such, the Committee of the European Green Party believes that *Partidul Verde* no longer meets *EGP's* membership criteria as outlined in Article 4.2 of the Statutes of the *European Green Party*.

The Committee of the *European Green Party* specifically expresses its doubts on the following points:

- *participate actively in political life and in elections at a credible level;*
- *maintain a democratic political base and a democratic internal structure, including applying a gender balance principle;*



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- *adhere to the Green values from the European Green Charter in its principles, policies, structures and actions.*

Considering all the above, the **EGP Committee** recommends to the delegates of the 41st EGP Congress to be held in Warsaw, Poland, to terminate the membership of *Partidul Verde* in the *European Green Party* according to Article 4.16 of the Statutes of the *European Green Party*.